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This thesis develops a framework to price the implicit government guarantee 
embedded in the bonds issued by the Farm Credit System. It shows that the value of 
the implicit government guarantee for a specific bond is dependent on the yield spread, 
the risk-free interest rate, the maturity and the future value of the bond price. It also 
reconfirms Merton’s theory (1974) that yield spreads are influenced by variances of 
the firm (volatility square), maturity and quasi debt to collateral value ratio (d-ratio).  
Furthermore, the hypothetical bond yields for the Farm Credit System bonds without 
GSE status are calculated based on the Black-Scholes Model.  
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Chapter 1 
Farm Credit System 
1.1 Introduction 
The current financial crisis which was originally caused by the sub-prime crisis in 2007 
has long escalated to a global financial economic crisis. The failure of  two government 
sponsored enterprises (GSE) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has cost the US government 
billions of dollars. According to a report, “On Oct 21, 2010 FHFA estimates revealed that 
the bailout of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae will likely cost taxpayers $224–360 billion in 
total, with over $150 billion already provided”1.  
Since then, there has been a debate on the benefits and costs of GSE status. While many 
people think that the benefits of the GSEs to the economy are very significant, many 
other people think that the potential costs of the GSEs are so high that their GSE status 
should be removed.  
As one of the several GSEs, the Farm Credit System is in danger of losing its GSE status. 
One immediate question would be: what would be the impact on the Farm Credit System 
if it lost its GSE status? 
This thesis is devoted to answering this question.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Davidson, Paul "Fannie, Freddie bailout to cost taxpayers $154 billion". 2010-10-22 , USA Today 
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1.2 Overview 
The Farm Credit System (FCS) is a government sponsored enterprise (GSE) established 
in 1916 by the U.S. Congress. Its mission is “to provide sound and dependable credit to 
American farmers, ranchers, producers or harvesters of aquatic products, their 
cooperatives and certain farm-related businesses”2. The system consists of three parts: the 
Farm Credit System Associations (Associations), the Farm Credit System Banks (Banks) 
and the Farm Credit System Funding Cooperation (FFCB). A USDA Economic Research 
released at the end of 2008 shows that approximately 39 percent of the real estate and 
non-real estate credit needs of U.S. agriculture were met by System institutions3. 
As of December 31, 2010, the FCS had 5 Banks (Ag First Farm Credit Bank, AgriBank, 
Farm Credit Bank of Texas, U.S. AgBank and CoBank) and 84 Associations throughout 
the nation. Unlike commercial banks, the 5 Banks and the 84 Associations do not take 
deposits, “the Banks obtain a substantial majority of funds for their lending operations 
through the issuance of Systemwide Debt Securities, but also obtain some of their funds 
from internally generated earnings, from the issuance of common and preferred equities 
and from the issuance of subordinated debt”4.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Please refer to P.5 of the annual report 2010 released by FFCB. 
3 http://www.farmcredit-ffcb.com/farmcredit/fcsystem/overview.jsp 
4 Please refer to P.7 of the annual report 2010 released by FFCB. 
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1.3 Business Model 
Figure 1 depicts how the Farm Credit System works5.  
 
Figure 1 Participators of the Farm Credit System 
The Banks can participate in the issuance of Systemwide Debt Securities (Farm Credit 
System bonds) to raise money. The Federal Farm Credit Bank Funding Coopertaion 
issues bonds on a daily basis to meet the needs of the Banks. The Farm Credit System 
bonds will be sold in the capital market through a selling group dealers.  As of December 
31st 2010, there were 30 members in this group. The primary holders of the FCS bonds 
are “commercial banks, states, municipalities, pension and money-market funds, 
insurance companies, investment companies, corporations and foreign banks and 
govenments”6all over the world. Funds raised by the bond issuance will be given to the 
Banks. The Banks will make wholesale loans to the Associations. The Associations will 
offer loans to farmers. 
                                                 
5 http://www.farmcredit-ffcb.com/farmcredit/fcsystem/overview.jsp 
6 Please refer to P.11 of the annual report 2010 released by FFCB 
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Regarding the repayments of the bonds: The farmers will pay their loans back to the 
Associations. This money will be used by the Associations to repay their wholesale loans 
to the Banks. The Banks will pay the Federal Farm Credit Funding Corporation, who will 
use this money to pay the coupons and the principals of the bonds to the investors 
through the selling group dealers.  
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1.4 Structure and Ownership 
The ownership of the Farm Credit System is depicted in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 2 Ownership of the Farm Credit System 
The 84 Associations are owned by their borrowers including farmers, ranchers, rural 
homeowners and other eligible borrowers. The 5 Banks are primarily owned by their 
affiliated Associations. Unlike the other 4 Banks which are wholly owned by their 
affiliated Associations, the CoBank is owned by cooperatives, other eligible borrowers 
and the affiliated Associations. The 5 Banks own the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding 
Corporation jointly.  
                                                 
7 Please refer to P.5 of the annual report 2010 released by FFCB 
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The Farm Credit Administration is the regulator of  the Farm Credit System who 
supervises the whole system. The Farm Credit Administration is a federal agency. 
The Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation is an independent U.S. Government-
controlled corporation , which was founded in the late 1980s. It provides additional 
protections to the Farm Credit System by insuring, “to the extent that funds are available, 
the timely payment of principal and  interest on the Farm Credit Debt Securities”8. 
The Farm Credit Council is “a federated trade association representing the System before 
Congress, the Executive Branch and others”9.  
The Farm Credit System is dependent on its GSE status and has benefited a lot from its 
implicit government guarantee. However, it is in danger of losing its GSE status due to 
the current financial crisis. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the impact that the 
loss of GSE status might have on the pricing of the Farm Credit System bonds and the 
bond yield that the Farm Credit System can offer its rural and cooperative customers. In 
order to achieve this purpose, specific objectives are 
a. To provide an overview of Farm Credit System bond pricing relative to treasuries 
b. To determine the market price of risk for Farm Credit System bonds 
c. To determine the benefit of the implicit government guarantee 
d. To assess the consequences of loss of GSE status. 
More technically, this thesis investigates  
                                                 
8 http://www.farmcredit-ffcb.com/farmcredit/fcsystem/overview.jsp 
9 Please refer to P.12 of the annual report 2010 released by FFCB 
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e. Why could GSE status be interpreted as a implicit European put option and how is 
the put option price determined? 
f. What are the factors influencing the yield spreads? 
g. What are the hypothetical yields for the Farm Credit System bonds with different 
maturities without GSE status? 
While some research which has been done earlier considered GSE status and the implicit 
government guarantee of the Farm Credit System, none has advanced to the point of 
quantitative assessment.  
This thesis is primarily based on the Black-Scholes-Model, Merton’s paper “On the 
Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates” published in 1974 and 
Gray, Merton and Bodie’s paper “Contingent Claims Approach to Measuring and 
Managing Sovereign Credit Risk” published in 2007. Viewing the Farm Credit System 
bonds problem through the lens of option pricing is an original contribution of this thesis.   
The thesis is organized as follows. In the first chapter the overview, the business model 
and the structure and the ownership of the Farm Credit System are presented. A literature 
review can be found in the second section, which summarizes the previous research 
related to GSE status of the Farm Credit System. The third chapter demonstrates the 
model. Chapter four is used to describe the data. Results are presented in the fifth section. 
Chapter six concludes. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
Not much research has been done on the Farm Credit System bonds. Previous research 
primarily focuses on the structure of the FCS and the justifications of GSE status. Most of 
them use qualitative arguments rather than quantitative arguments.  
Lins and Barry (1984) summarize the previous research focusing on the question if and 
how GSE status should be removed. They present the pros and cons of GSE status and 
discuss the economic impact of different ways of removing GSE status. The alternative 
includes (a) abrupt removal of part or all of the regulatory exemptions and preferences, 
(b) phased removal of selected exemptions and preferences, (c) phased removal by 
limiting the amount of agency securities issued, and (d) an increasing fee schedule for the 
privilege of agency status until the agency involved voluntarily drops the status. 
However, they are unable to decide which alternative is better and conclude that the 
magnitudes of the impact of these alternatives are still disputed.  
Freshwater (1997) assesses the pros and contras of the Farm Credit System as a GSE. 
He argues that since the agricultural sector has become less important and the capital 
market has become more efficient, GSE status is not as necessary as it used to be. Still, 
despite the rapid development of the capital market, it is not perfect. A clearly defined 
focus and the expansion of the FCS’s business to nonagricultural credit needs could 
justify its GSE status.  
Jensen (2000) uses a supply and demand model and an options model to show that the 
existing competitive market is enough to meet the credit needs and GSE status does not 
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seem to be justified. Moreover, the implicit guarantee enables the borrowers to transfer 
risks to taxpayers, which leads to deadweight losses.   
Lee and Irwin (1996) focus on the restructuring process of the FCS since its 
establishment in 1916. The FCS tried to reduce the number of Banks and Associations to 
reduce costs and achieve higher efficiency. However, there is no proof that the 
restructuring led to a better financial performance.  
In one of the only qualitative assessment on the Farm Credit System, Tauer and 
Weersink (1988) discuss the optimal risk-premium of the FCS based on a dynamic 
optimization model and show how to minimize the cost of a member borrowing. They 
find that as the equity of the FCS increases, the perceived risk of bond holders falls and 
the associated risk premium required by investors declines.   
In conclusion, little research has been done to quantify the impact of GSE status on the 
cost of raising capital, which is the primary focus of this thesis. Previous research on the 
FCS could be used as complements to this thesis. They address many other issues which 
are not covered in this thesis.  
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Chatper3 
Model 
3.1 Basic Idea 
As described in chapter 1.3, the Banks get fund through bond issuances. According to the 
annual report 2010 released by the Federal Farm Credit Bank Funding Cooperation 
(FFCB), Farm Credit Administration regulations require the Banks to maintain a net 
collateral ratio of at least 103%10. The “net collateral ratio” is defined as “net collateral 
(primarily earning assets) divided by total liabilities less subordinated debt, subject to 
certain limits”11. 
Since the Farm Credit System does not disclose the net collateral ratio applied for every 
single bond issuance, outsiders do not know the exact net collateral ratio for a given bond.  
Therefore, it is reasonable for outsiders to assume that the Banks maintain a net collateral 
ratio of 103% for all bond issuances.   
The two most important assets of the Farm Credit System are net loans and cash, federal 
funds sold and investments. The ratios of net loans and cash, federal funds sold and 
investment to the total assets have remained stable over the years. The total assets of the 
Farm Credit System in 2010 are displayed in Figure 3. 
 
                                                 
10 Please refer to FFCB annual report 2010 page 17 “Bank Collateral Requirements” section 
11 Please refer to FFCB annual report 2010 page 44 “Structural Risk Management “ section 
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Figure 3 Compositions of the Farm Credit System’s assets in 2010 
Moreover, subordinated debt was 0.84% of the total liabilities in both 2010 and 2009, 
0.56% of the total liabilities in 2008 and 0.31% of the total liabilities in 200712 , which 
was so small that could be ignored in the calculation.  Therefore, the first relationship 
which could be derived from the FFCB Annual Report 2010 is: 
࡭ሺ૙ሻ ൌ ૚. ૙૜ࡸሺ૙ሻ (1) 
with ࡭ሺ૙ሻ representing the collateral value at the time of bond issuance and ࡸሺ૙ሻ 
representing the liabilities at the time of the bond issuance.  
The liabilities of the Farm Credit System at the time of the bond issuance are the money 
received from the bond issuance. For a zero-coupon bond with the face value ࡮, yield-to-
maturity ࢟ and maturity ࢀ, the liabilities at time 0 are defined as  
                                                 
12 Please refer to FFCB annual report 2010 page 3 
76%
20%
4%
Total Assets of FCS 2010
net loan
cash, federal funds sold
and investments
others
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ࡸሺ૙ሻ ൌ ࡮ࢋି࢟ࢀ. 
It will be shown in chapter 3.4 that coupon payments will not influence the results. 
Therefore, coupon payments will be ignored in this chapter for simplicity’s sake.  
A bond with the face value ࡮ has a present value of ࡮ࢋି࢘ࢀ at the time of the bond 
issuance, given the risk-free interest rate is ࢘. However, if the yield-to-maturity	࢟  and the 
risk-free interest rate ࢘ are different, the market value of the bond (liabilities at time 0) 
has less value than the present value of the face value ሺ࡮ࢋି࢘ࢀ) because of the risks 
attached to the bond. The difference between a risk-free bond and a risky bond is a bond 
guarantee, which guarantees the repayment of the face value ࡮ in case of default: 
L(0)= Risk-free Bond – Bond Guarantee (2) 
The bond guarantee can also be interpreted as an implicit European put option ࡼ(0) on 
the collateral with the strike price K and the same maturity as the bond.  
The next step is to find the strike price K, which can be derived from the definition of the 
bond guarantee. Since the implicit put allows the put holder to sell the collateral at the 
price of K at time ࢀ to cover the bond repayment, the strike price K must be equal to the 
liabilities of the Farm Credit System at time ࢀ. For a bond without coupon payments, the 
liabilities at time T are the face value of the bond B: 
ࡷ ൌ ࡸሺࢀሻ ൌ ࡮			(3) 
With a put option, equation (2) could be redefined as  
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ࡸሺ૙ሻ ൌ ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ. 
The difference between the collateral value A(0) and the liabilities Lሺ૙ሻ	 is the excessive 
value of the collateral over the liabilities at time 0, which is nothing but the equity of the 
Farm Credit System at time 0. The equity allows the Farm Credit System to buy the 
collateral at the price of B at time T (Farm Credit System repays the bond on time and 
leaves the collateral untouched). Thus, equity is an implicit European call option C	ሺ૙ሻ	 
on the collateral with the strike price B and the same maturity as the bond:  
Collateral = Liabilities + Equity 
A(0) =  ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൅	C (0) (4) 
Moreover, it is interesting to notice that the above equation must always hold. The put-
call parity is used to prove it. The put-call parity requires that the put option price must be 
equal to the present value of the strike price plus the call option price less the spot price 
of the underlying asset. Mathematically, it is 
ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡭ሺ૙ሻ ൅ ࡯ሺ૙ሻ 
Using equation (4) and substitute the put option price with the put-call parity, it yields: 
A(0) = ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ ൅ ࡭ሺ૙ሻ െ ࡯ሺ૙ሻ ൅	C (0) 
࡭ሺ૙ሻ ൌ ࡭ሺ૙ሻ 
The Figure 4 summarizes and visualizes the above findings: 
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At the time of the bond issuance, the call option allows the call holder (Farm Credit 
System) to buy the collateral with a strike price B at time T, the Put option allows the put 
holder (Farm Credit System) to sell the collateral at the price of  B at time T . Since the 
Farm Credit Administration regulations require the net collateral ratio to be no less than 
103%, equity is positive at time	૙. 
 
Figure 4 Relationship between collateral, liabilities and equity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collateral Aሺ0ሻ ۰܍ିܚ܂ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ 
Risky Bond 
(Liabilities) 
Implicit Call (Equity) 
C	ሺ0ሻ
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3.2 The Impact of GSE status 
Generally speaking, if there were no GSE status, the bond price ࡸሺ૙ሻ with the face value 
࡮, a promised coupon payment of ࡯  per period, a yield to maturity ࢟ᇱ	ሺ࢟ᇱ	is used to 
represent the yield of a bond without GSE status) and maturity ࢀ would be 
ࡸሺ૙ሻ ൌ෍࡯ࢋି࢟ᇲ࢚
ࢀ
࢚ୀ૚
൅ ࡮ࢋି࢟ᇲࢀ 
Since there are risks attached to a bond, investors  expect a risk premium for the money 
they invest for that risky bond. A risk premium is the spread ࢙′ (࢙′ is used to represent the 
spread of the Farm Credit System bonds without GSE status) between the bond yield	࢟ᇱ 
and the risk-free interest rate ࢘. 
࢙′ ൌ ࢟ᇱ െ ࢘ 
With respect to the risk-free interest rate: since the treausry bonds enjoy the explicit 
guarantee of the US government, the yields of the US treasury bonds will be used as risk-
free interest rates ࢘.  
If a given bond has a zero spread, it means that investors consider this bond to be risk-
free. Investors expect positive spread for a risky bond, because they need to get 
compensation for the risk they are taking. With other words, the expected payments of 
the coupons ࡯࢚ and the face value ࡮ࢀ	are less than the stated amount of payments. For a 
risk-neutral investor, it is 
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∑ ࡯ࢋି࢟ᇲ࢚ࢀ࢚ୀ૚ ൅ ࡮ࢋି࢟ᇲࢀ ൌ ∑ ࡯࢚ࢋି࢚࢘ࢀ࢚ୀ૚ ൅ ࡮ࢀࢋି࢘ࢀ ൏ ∑ ࡯ࢋି࢚࢘ࢀ࢚ୀ૚ ൅ ࡮ࢋି࢘ࢀ (5) 
At the time of the bond issuance, the expected coupon payments for all periods should be 
the same (࡯૚ ൌ ࡯૛ ൌ ⋯ ൌ ࡯ࢀሻ	because the expected underlying risks are the same. 
For any period before the bond matures, the difference between the promised payment ࡯ 
and the expected payment ࡯࢚ could be interpreted as a put option, which is sold by the 
investor and bought by the bond issuer at time 0.  The value of the put at the expiration 
date is  
ࡼሺ࢚ሻ ൌ 	࡯ െ ࡯࢚ (6) 
This put option allows the bond issuer to default on the coupon payment. In exchange for 
this right, the bond issuer pays the bond holder more money ሺ࡯ instead of ࡯࢚ሻ  if he 
decides not to exercise the put option. 
Since both ࡯ and ࡯࢚ will be the same for all periods, ࡼሺ࢚ሻ will stay the same for all 
periods13.  
The put price will change when the bond matures. At this time, not only the coupon but 
also the face value of the bond need to be paid. The value of the put ࡼሺࢀሻ at the 
expiration date is 
ࡼሺࢀሻ ൌ 	࡯ െ ࡯ࢀ ൅ ࡮ െ ࡮ࢀ ൐ ࡼሺ࢚ሻ (7) 
By substituting (6) and (7) in equation (5), it could be rearranged as 
                                                 
13 Time value of money is not considered at this point. 
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෍ሺ࡯െ ࡼሺ࢚ሻሻࢋି࢚࢘
ࢀି૚
࢚ୀ૚
൅ ൫࡮ ൅ ࡯ െ ࡼሺࢀሻ൯ࢋି࢘ࢀ
ൌ෍࡯ࢋି࢚࢘
ࢀ
࢚ୀ૚
൅ ࡮ࢋି࢘ࢀ െ෍ࡼሺ࢚ሻࢋି࢚࢘
ࢀି૚
࢚ୀ૚
െ ࡼሺࢀሻࢋି࢘ࢀ 
Therefore, the liabilities (bond price) for the bond issuer at the time of the bond issuance 
is the present value of all future cash flows minus a compounded put option consisting of 
ࢀ European put options14 with the expiration date on each scheduled payment date. For 
simplicity’s sake, the compounded option will be referred to as option ࡼሺ૙ሻ 
ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ ෍ࡼሺ࢚ሻࢋି࢚࢘
ࢀି૚
࢚ୀ૚
൅ ࡼሺࢀሻࢋି࢘ࢀ 
and 
ࡸሺ૙ሻ ൌ෍࡯ࢋି࢚࢘
ࢀ
࢚ୀ૚
൅ ࡮ࢋି࢘ࢀ െ෍ࡼሺ࢚ሻࢋି࢚࢘
ࢀି૚
࢚ୀ૚
൅ ࡼሺࢀሻࢋି࢘ࢀ ൌ෍࡯ࢋି࢚࢘
ࢀ
࢚ୀ૚
൅ ࡮ࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ. 
With the  GSE status, the expected coupon payments and expected face value repayment 
will increase due to the implicit guarantee of the governement. 
࡯࢚ࡳࡿࡱ ൐ ࡯࢚	ܽ݊݀ ࡮ࢀࡳࡿࡱ ൐ ࡮ࢀ (8) 
By substituting equation (8) into equation (6) and (7), it yields 
 ࡼሺ࢚ሻࡳࡿࡱ ൌ 	࡯ െ ࡯࢚ࡳࡿࡱ ൏ ࡼሺ࢚ሻ  
                                                 
14 This model is valid for bonds with annual coupon payment. This model could be easily adjusted to semi-
annual coupon payments (2ࢀ options instead of ࢀ options).  
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ࡼሺࢀሻࡳࡿࡱ ൌ 	࡯ െ ࡯࢚ࡳࡿࡱ ൅ ࡮ െ ࡮ࢀࡳࡿࡱ ൏ ࡼሺࢀሻ 
Therefore, by holding everything else constant, the compounded put price with GSE 
status will be smaller than the compounded put price without GSE status.  
ࡼሺ૙ሻࡳࡿࡱ ൌ ෍ࡼሺ࢚ሻࡳࡿࡱࢋି࢚࢘
ࢀି૚
࢚ୀ૚
൅ ࡼሺࢀሻࡳࡿࡱࢋି࢘ࢀ ൏ ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ ෍ࡼሺ࢚ሻࢋି࢚࢘
ࢀି૚
࢚ୀ૚
൅ ࡼሺࢀሻࢋି࢘ࢀ 
The difference between the compounded put price without GSE status and the 
compounded put price with GSE status is the impact of the implicit government 
guarantee on the bond price.  
Since the compounded put price with GSE status is smaller than the compounded put 
price without GSE status ࡼሺ૙ሻࡳࡿࡱ ൏ ࡼሺ૙ሻ, the bond issued by the Farm Credit System 
with GSE status has a higher price ࡸሺ૙ሻࡳࡿࡱ ൐ ࡸሺ૙ሻ,	the yield of the bond is lower ࢟ ൏
࢟ᇱ. The Farm Credit System benefits from GSE status and the cost for captial is lower.  
For Example, if investors expect that the the government will pay back all FCS’s 
liabilities for sure in case of default,  which means 
࡯࢚ࡳࡿࡱ ൌ ࡯	ܽ݊݀ ࡮ࢀࡳࡿࡱ ൌ ࡮ 
It would indicate that  
ࡼሺ࢚ሻࡳࡿࡱ ൌ 	࡯ െ ࡯࢚ࡳࡿࡱ ൌ ૙ 
ࡼሺࢀሻࡳࡿࡱ ൌ 	࡯ െ ࡯࢚ࡳࡿࡱ ൅ ࡮ െ ࡮ࢀࡳࡿࡱ ൌ ૙ 
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This means that the price for the compounded put price is zero. 
ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ ૙ 
The bond price would be  
ࡸሺ૙ሻ ൌ෍࡯ࢋି࢚࢘
ࢀ
࢚ୀ૚
൅ ࡮ࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ෍࡯ࢋି࢚࢘
ࢀ
࢚ୀ૚
൅ ࡮ࢋି࢘ࢀ 
This means, if investors expect that there is no risk attached to the bond, the bond price is 
the present value of all future cash flows.  
However, since an implicit guarantee is not equivalent to an explicit guarantee, investors 
will not expect that ࡯࢚ࡳࡿࡱ ൌ ࡯ and ࡮ࢀࡳࡿࡱ ൌ ࡮. Therefore, ࡼሺ૙ሻ is bigger than 0 and the 
bond price is lower than the present value of all future cash flows. The Farm Credit 
System issuses bond at a rate which is higher than the risk-free interest rate ሺ࢟ ൐ ࢘). 
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3.3 Risk  
The Farm Credit System is not risk-free because the value of the collateral changes over 
time. The two most important compositions of the assets which are used as collateral for 
bonds are loans and investment. As shown in Figure 3, they account for 76% and 20% of 
the whole assets, respectively.  The values of these two parts together determine if the 
Farm Credit System is able to repay the bond on time.  
Regarding the loans on the asset side of the Farm Credit System: farmers get loans from 
the Associations; the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation issues bonds to 
raise money for the farmers. As long as the collateral value does not fall below a certain 
barrier, farmers will pay back their loans. The Farm Credit System will have enough 
money to repay their bonds. The investors will get their money back from the Farm 
Credit System. However, if the collateral value falls below a certain barrier, it is better for 
the farmers to default on their loans. The Farm Credit System gets the collateral instead. 
The loans of the Farm Credit system consist of different loan programs, of which only 
about half of them are the traditional agricultural loans which are collateralized by lands. 
However, since land prices are a good indicator for the overall performance of the 
agricultural business, historical land price volatility is used as a proxy for the volatility of 
the loans.  
It is hard to estimate the market perception for the volatility of the investments, which 
account for 20% of the whole asset. Even though it is possible to calculate the annual 
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change of the investments15 and derive the historical volatility of the investments, there is 
not enough information disclosed in the annual report which can be used to derive the 
correlation between the volatility of the loans and the volatility of the investments. 
Therefore, it is impossible to derive the overall volatility of the business of the Farm 
Credit System (the volatility of the collateral).  
Since the main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate a mechanism which can be used to 
derive the yield spreads of the Farm Credit System bonds without GSE status, the market 
perception of the operation volatility of the Farm Credit System without GSE status is not 
the focus of this paper. Therefore, it is assumed that the historical land price volatility 
represents the volatility of the Farm Credit System’s business.  To make the model more 
robust, a sensitivity analysis with various volatilities is done to show the impact of 
different collateral volatilities.  
If the Farm Credit System had no GSE status, it would have no choice but to default on 
the loan once they were in liquidity problem. The investors would not be able to get all of 
their money back. However, since the Farm Credit System has a GSE status, the market 
may expect that the government would help the Farm Credit System to repay the debt in 
difficult times. Therefore, the expected coupon payments and the expected principal 
repayment increase. In other words, the implicit guarantee changes investors’ perception 
of the risk (volatility of land price) the Farm Credit System is exposed to. 
To derive the market perception for the volatility of the FCS with GSE status, the put 
price needs to be calculated. It is shown earlier that  
                                                 
15 Data are available from 1997 to 2010. 
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ࡷࢋି࢟ࢀ ൌ ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ. 
Solving the above equation16, the yield of the risky debt is 
࢟ ൌ െ૚ࢀ ࢒࢔
ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ
ࡷ  
The spread ࢙ between the risk-free interest rate and the yield of the risky debt is17 
࢙ ൌ ࢟ െ ࢘ ൌ െ૚ࢀ ܔܖ	ሺ૚ െ
ࡼሺ૙ሻ
ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀሻ 
Rearrange the equation and solve for ࡼሺ૙ሻ, it yields 
ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢋି࢙ࢀሻࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ (9) 
This equation shows a way to calculate the price of the implicit put option. The put 
option price only depends on the spread ࢙, the risk-free interest rate ࢘ and the maturity of 
the debt ࢀ. 
Since all these three variables are observable, the put price for a given bond at the time of 
the bond issuance ࡼሺ૙ሻ can be calculated. Once the put price ࡼሺ૙ሻ is calculated, this can 
be plugged into the Black-Scholes Model and used to derive the implied volatilities of the 
land price, which is market perception for the risk of the Farm Credit System business 
under GSE status.  
 
                                                 
16 Detailed calculation see appendix 1 which can be found at the end of the section. 
17 Detailed calculation see appendix 2 which can be found at the end of the section. 
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Example  
On February 10th 2011, the 3M treasury yield (࢘) was 0.12%, the 3M bond yield issued 
by the Farm Credit System (࢟) was 0.2168%. The spread (࢙) between the bond yield and 
the treasury yield was 0.0968%. The maturity of the bond ሺࢀሻ was 0.25. 
Plugging  ࢘, ࢙	and ࢀ into equation (9) and taking ࡮ ൌ ࡷ ൌ ૚૙૙, it yields the put option 
price at the time of the debt issuance	ࡼሺ૙ሻ, which was $0.024. The liabilities at time 0 
were $99.94 and the value of the equity (call) was $3.00. The collateral required for this 
bond issuance was $102.94. 
This means, for a 3M bond with a face value of $100 issued on February 10th 2011, the 
price for a put which guaranteed the repayment of $100 in 3 months (face value of the 
bond) was $0.024.  The liabilities which were equal to the amount of money the Farm 
Credit System receives were $99.94, the value of the call (equity) was $3.00. The value 
of the liabilities and the value of the equity summed up to $102.94, which was equal to 
the value of the collateral.  
Plugging the put price	ࡼሺ૙ሻ	ሺ$0.024), A(0) ($102.94), K ($100) and r (0.12%) into the 
Black-Scholes Model to derive the implied volatilities, which ensured that the put price 
calculated by the Black-Scholes model was equal to the implicit put option price ࡼሺ૙ሻ. 
The implied volatility of the land price in this case was 3.27%. This was the market 
expectation for the land price volatility the Farm Credit System with GSE status was 
bearing on February 10th 2011.  If the implied volatility of the land price were smaller 
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than the actual volatility of the land price on this day, the Farm Credit System would 
benefit from GSE status.  
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3.4 Coupon Payments  
The above model totally ignores coupon payments during the life of a given bond. In this 
section, it is shown that coupon payments do not influence the results. 
The amount of money received at the time of the bond issuance is the bond price ࡮ࡼሺ૙ሻ 
which is equal to the liabilities ࡸሺ૙ሻ. This is the market value of all coupon payments and 
the market value of the face value at time 0. 
Mathematically, it is 
࡮ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ ࡸሺ૙ሻ ൌ෍ࢉ࢕࢛࢖࢕࢔	࢖ࢇ࢟࢓ࢋ࢔࢚࢚ࢋି࢚࢟
ࢀ
࢚ୀ૙
൅ ሺࡲࢇࢉࢋ	ࢂࢇ࢒࢛ࢋሻࢋି࢟ࢀ 
The value of all coupon payments as of time 0 is ∑ ࢉ࢕࢛࢖࢕࢔	࢖ࢇ࢟࢓ࢋ࢔࢚࢚ࢋି࢚࢟ࢀ࢚ୀ૙ . The 
future value of all the coupon payments as of time ࢀ is  
ࢋ࢟ࢀ෍ࢉ࢕࢛࢖࢕࢔	࢖ࢇ࢟࢓ࢋ࢔࢚࢚ࢋି࢚࢟
ࢀ
࢚ୀ૙
 
Therefore, the strike price ࡷ of the put option on a bond with coupon payments at time ࢀ 
is the sum of the face value and the future value of all coupon payments at time ࢀ. 
Mathematically, it is 
ࡷ ൌ ࡲࢇࢉࢋ	ࢂࢇ࢒࢛ࢋ ൅ ࢋ࢟ࢀ ∑ ࢉ࢕࢛࢖࢕࢔	࢖ࢇ࢟࢓ࢋ࢔࢚࢚ࢋି࢚࢟ࢀ࢚ୀ૙ ൌ ࢋ࢟ࢀࡸሺ૙ሻ  (10) 
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If the strike price ࡷ of a put option changes, the implicit put option price ࡼሺ૙ሻ will 
change accordingly. The price of the implicit put option is shown in the previous chapter 
and it is  
ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢋି࢙ࢀሻࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ 
The derivatives of the put price with respect to the strike price is  
ࢊࡼሺ૙ሻ
ࢊࡷ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢋ
ି࢙ࢀሻࢋି࢘ࢀ	ሺ૚૚ሻ 
It is shown that the relationship between the put price and the strike price is linear if the 
spread and risk-free interest rate are given.  
Moreover,	it	is	assumed	earlier	that	the	ratio	between	the	value	of	the	collateral	
࡭ሺ૙ሻ	and	the	value	of	the	liabilities	Lሺ૙ሻ	at	time	0	is	always	103%.	Substituting	this	
relationship	into	equation	ሺ10ሻ,	it	yields	
ࡷ ൌ ࢋ࢟ࢀࡸሺ૙ሻ ൌ ࢋ࢟ࢀ ૚૚. ૙૜࡭ሺ૙ሻ 
which can be rearranged to  
࡭ሺ૙ሻ
ࡷ ൌ ૚. ૙૜ࢋି࢟ࢀ(12) 
It shows that the ratio between the collateral value and the strike price never changes. 
According to the Black-Scholes Model, the put price is  
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ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀࡺሺെࢊ૛ሻ െ ࡭ሺ૙ሻࡺሺെࢊ૚) (13) 
Substituting	equation	ሺ12ሻ	into	equation	ሺ13ሻ,	it	yields	
ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ ࡷሺࢋି࢘ࢀࡺሺെࢊ૛ሻ െ ૚. ૙૜ࢋି࢟ࢀࡺሺെࢊ૚)) 
The formula for ࢊ૚ and ࢊ૛ are 
ࢊ૚ ൌ
ܔܖ ቀ࡭ሺ૙ሻࡷ ቁ ൅ ቀ࢘ ൅
࣌૛
૛ ቁ ࢀ
࣌√ࢀ  
and 
ࢊ૛ ൌ
࢒࢔ ቀ࡭ሺ૙ሻࡷ ቁ ൅ ቀ࢘ െ
࣌૛
૛ ቁࢀ
࣌√ࢀ 	
Substituting (12) in ࢊ૚ and ࢊ૛, it yields 
ࢊ૚ ൌ
࢒࢔ሺ૚. ૙૜ࢋି࢟ࢀሻ ൅ ቀ࢘ ൅ ࣌૛૛ ቁࢀ
࣌√ࢀ  
and 
ࢊ૛ ൌ
࢒࢔ሺ૚. ૙૜ࢋି࢟ࢀሻ ൅ ቀ࢘ െ ࣌૛૛ ቁࢀ
࣌√ࢀ 	
The derivatives of the put price to the strike price is 
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ࢊࡼሺ૙ሻ
ࢊࡷ ൌ ࢋ
ି࢘ࢀࡺሺെࢊ૛ሻ െ ૚. ૙૜ࢋି࢟ࢀࡺሺെࢊ૚ሻ
െ ࡷ൬ࢋି࢘ࢀࡺᇱሺെࢊ૛ሻ ࣔࢊ૛ࣔࡷ െ ૚. ૙૜ࢋ
ି࢟ࢀࡺᇱሺെࢊ૚ሻ ࣔࢊ૚ࣔࡷ൰ ሺ૚૝ሻ 
By equating equation (14) and equation (11), it yields 
ሺ૚ െ ࢋି࢙ࢀሻࢋି࢘ࢀ ൌ ࢋି࢘ࢀࡺሺെࢊ૛ሻ െ ૚. ૙૜ࢋି࢟ࢀࡺሺെࢊ૚ሻ െ ࡷቀࢋି࢘ࢀࡺᇱሺെࢊ૛ሻ ࣔࢊ૛ࣔࡷ െ
૚. ૙૜ࢋି࢟ࢀࡺᇱሺെࢊ૚ሻ ࣔࢊ૚ࣔࡷቁ ሺ૚૞ሻ  
If the risk-free interest rate ࢘, the spread ࢙ and the maturity ࢀ are given18, the term on the 
LHS of the equation is a constant and does not change with the strike price. If equation 
(15) needs to hold, it requires that ࢊ૚ and ࢊ૛ do not change, given a change of the strike 
price. This condition will ensure that the terms on the RHS of equation (15) is a constant, 
even though the strike price does not remain the same. As shown in the formula, ࢊ૚and 
ࢊ૛ are dependent on the yield-to-maturity of the bond, the risk-free interest rate, the 
maturity and the variances of the collateral.  Since the yield-to-maturity, the risk-free 
interest rate and the maturity are given, the only way to make  ࢊ૚ and ࢊ૛ unchanged with 
a change of the strike price is to keep the implied volatility ࣌ (and the variance of the 
collateral) unchanged with a change of the strike price ࡷ. 
Since the change of the strike price does not have an influence on the implied volatility ࣌ 
(and the variance of the collateral) for a given ࢘, ࡿ and ࢀ, coupon payments do not 
change the implied volatilities ࣌ሺand	the	variance	of	the	collateralሻ. 
                                                 
 
 
18 ࢘, ࡿ and ࢀ are observable in our model 
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Figure 5 summarizes and visualizes the logic of the proof: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Coupon payments and the implied volatilities 
 
 
 
 
 
Present value of all coupon payments can 
be compounded forward to time T to get 
the future value of this liability  
The total liability of the Farm Credit System 
is the sum of the face value AND the future 
value of all coupon payments at time T 
The relationship between the strike price 
and the implicit put option price is linear 
The ONLY possible way to ensure a linear 
relationship between the put price derived 
by the Black‐Scholes Model and the strike 
price is that the implied volatility does not 
change with the strike price 
The coupon payments will raise the strike 
price of the put by the amount of the 
future value of all coupon payments 
Coupon Payments do not change the implied volatilities 
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Example 
On January 27th 2011, the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation issued a 10-
Year bullet bond with the coupon rate of 3.91%. The yield-to-maturity for this bond was 
3.675%.  The 10-Year Treasury yield on this day was 3.42%. The spread between the 
bond yield and the treasury yield was 0.255%.  
Based on continuously compounded interests, the market value of a bond with a face 
value of $100 was  
࡮ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ ࡸሺ૙ሻ ൌ෍૚૙૙ ∗ ૜. ૢ૚% ∗ ࢋି૜.૟ૠ૞%૛ ∗࢚
૛૙
࢚ୀ૙
൅ 	૚૙૙ࢋି૜.૟ૠ૞%∗૚૙ ൌ ૚૙૚. ૢ૚૞ 
This liability in 10 years would be  
ࡸሺࢀሻ ൌ ૚૙૚. ૢ૚૞ ∗ ࢋ૜.૟ૠ૞%∗૚૙ ൌ ૚૝ૠ. ૚ૡ 
The strike price of the put was the future value of the liability which was $147.18. 
Therefore, the put price for a bond with a face value of $100 was  
ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢋି࢙ࢀሻࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ ൌ ൫૚ െ ࢋି૙.૛૞૞%∗૚૙൯૚૝ૠ. ૚ૡࢋି૜.૝૛%∗૚૙ ൌ ૛. ૟૜ 
The liability of the Farm Credit System on January 27th 2011 for a bond with the face 
value of $100 was equal to the bond price at time 0 which was $૚૙૚. ૢ૚૞. 
The collateral ࡭ሺ૙ሻ	required for a bond with the face value of $100 was  
࡭ሺ૙ሻ ൌ ૚. ૙૜ ∗ ࡸሺ૙ሻ ൌ ૚. ૙૜ ∗ ૚૙૚. ૢ૚૞ ൌ ૚૙૝. ૢૠ 
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Plugging the collateral value $૚૙૝. ૢૠ, the strike price of the put option $147.18, the 
maturity 10 years, the risk-free interest rate 3.42%  and the implicit put price $2.63 into 
the Black-Scholes Model to get the implied volatilities, which is 2.15%. 
If the coupon payments were ignored, the strike price of the put option was the face value 
of the bond. The put price for a bond with a face value of $100 was $1.79.  
ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢋି࢙ࢀሻࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ ൌ ൫૚ െ ࢋି૙.૛૞૞%∗૚૙൯૚૙૙ࢋି૜.૝૛%∗૚૙ ൌ ૚. ૠૢ 
The liability of the Farm Credit System on January 27th 2011 for a bond with the face 
value of $100 was equivalent to the money received for this bond. 
ࡸሺ૙ሻ ൌ ࡮ࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ ൌ ૚૙૙ ∗ ࢋି૜.૝૛%∗૚૙ െ ૚. ૠૢ ൌ ૟ૢ. ૛૞ 
The collateral ࡭ሺ૙ሻ	required for a bond with the face value of $100 was  
࡭ሺ૙ሻ ൌ ૚. ૙૜ ∗ ࡸሺ૙ሻ ൌ ૚. ૙૜ ∗ ૟ૢ. ૛૞ ൌ ૠ૚. ૜૛ 
The implied volatilities derived by the Black-Scholes Model was 2.15% which was 
exactly the same as the bond with coupon payments.	
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Appendix 1 
ࡷࢋି࢟ࢀ ൌ ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ. 
ࢋି࢟ࢀ ൌ ࡷࢋ
ି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ
ࡷ  
െ࢟ࢀ ൌ ࢒࢔ࡷࢋ
ି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ
ࡷ  
࢟ ൌ െ૚ࢀ ࢒࢔
ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ
ࡷ  
Appendix 2 
ࡿ ൌ ࢟ െ ࢘ ൌ െ૚ࢀ ࢒࢔
ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ
ࡷ െ ࢘ 
																							ൌ െ ૚ࢀ ࢒࢔
ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ
ࡷ ൅
૚
ࢀ ࢒࢔ࢋ
ି࢘ࢀ 
																							ൌ െ ૚ࢀ ࢒࢔ቆࢋ
ି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻࡷ ቇ ൅
૚
ࢀ ࢒࢔ࢋ
ି࢘ࢀ 
																						ൌ െ ૚ࢀ ሺ࢒࢔ ቆࢋ
ି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻࡷ ቇ െ ࢒࢔ࢋ
ି࢘ࢀሻ 
		ൌ െ૚ࢀ ܔܖ	ሺ૚ െ
ࡼሺ૙ሻ
ࡷࢋି࢘ࢀሻ 
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Chapter 4 
Data 
The yields of bonds with different maturities issued by the Farm Credit System are taken 
from the Federal Farm Credit Bank Curve which can be found on Bloomberg19.  
Specifically, the Federal Farm Credit Bank Curve is an index which is updated on a daily 
basis showing the yields of the bonds with different maturities issued by the Federal Farm 
Credit Banks Funding Corporations. The members of the index include the 3-Month bond, 
6-Month bond, 1-Year bond, 2-Year bond, 3-Year bond, 4-Year bond, 5-Year bond, 7-
Year bond, 8-Year bond, 9-Year bond, 10-Year bond, 15-Year bond and 20-Year bond. 
The beginning date of the data is January 13th 2009 and the ending date of the data is 
February 10th 2011. The total number of the observations for a given maturity is 522. The 
risk-free interest rates are the Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates published on the official 
website of the U.S. Department of the Treasury20. Since the corresponding treasury yields 
are not available for the 4-Year bond, 8-Year bond, 9-Year bond and 15-Year bond, the 
final data set used for this research include both the treasury yield and the yield of the 
Farm Credit System bonds with the maturities of 3-Month, 6-Month, 1-Year, 2-Year, 3-
Year, 5-Year, 7-Year, 10-Year and 20-Year.  
The summary statistics for the FCS bond yields are shown in Table 1: 
 
 
                                                 
19 Bloomberg ticker YCCF0078 INDEX 
20 http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-
rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield 
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FCS yield 3M 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 20Y 
MAX 0.77% 0.88% 1.26% 1.95% 2.35% 3.66% 4.53% 5.23% 5.87% 
MIN 0.03% 0.10% 0.25% 0.46% 0.64% 1.45% 2.05% 2.84% 3.86% 
AVERAGE 0.24% 0.32% 0.53% 1.12% 1.60% 2.60% 3.38% 4.12% 4.89% 
Median 0.19% 0.28% 0.44% 1.12% 1.71% 2.77% 3.60% 4.33% 4.97% 
Table 1 Summary statistics for the Farm Credit System bond yields 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 visualize the yields of the short-term bonds, medium-term and 
long-term bonds issued by the Farm Credit System, respectively.  
 
Figure 6 Short-term Farm Credit System bond yields 
The Short-term bond issued by the Farm Credit System had relatively low yields in 
January 2009, surged to the 2-year peak in February 2009 and fell back to their beginning 
levels in June 2009. The yields fell continuously until the end of December 2009. From 
the beginning of 2010 to April 2010, the short-term bond yields experienced a moderate 
increase. They fell again since then. The Yields of the 3-Month, 6-Month and 1-Year 
bonds were almost parallel to each other from January 2009 to May 2009 and from 
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December 2009 to January 2011. However, the 3-Month, 6-Month and 1-Year yields 
were almost the same from May 2009 to December 2009. There were days when the 3-
Month yield was higher than the 6-Month and 1-Year yields.   
 
Figure 7 Medium-term and long-term Farm Credit System bond yields 
The yields of the medium-term and long-term Farm Credit System bonds were more 
stable and almost parallel to each other.  The only obvious exception is that the yields of 
the 3-Year bond fell more quickly than the yields of the 2-Year bond during the period 
July 2010 to November 2010. 
The summary statistics for the spread between the treasury yield and the Farm Credit 
System bond yield are shown in Table 2: 
 Spread 3M 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y  7Y 10Y 20Y 
MAX 0.45% 0.48% 0.73% 1.05% 0.93% 1.22% 1.71% 1.66% 1.23% 
MIN  -0.15% -0.12% -0.04% 0.09% 0.08% 0.16% 0.13% 0.22% 0.27% 
AVERAGE 0.09% 0.08% 0.14% 0.30% 0.34% 0.54% 0.65% 0.86% 0.79% 
0.00%
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4.00%
6.00%
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MEDIAN 0.05% 0.06% 0.10% 0.22% 0.27% 0.39% 0.50% 0.89% 0.71% 
Table 2 Summary statistics for spreads 
It is surprising to see that the minimums for the 3-Month spread, 6-Month spread and 1-
Year spread are negative. Since spread is defined as the difference between the Farm 
Credit System bond yield and the treasury yield, a negative spread means that the Farm 
Credit System bond yield is smaller than the risk-free interest rate. This also means, the 
market is willing to accept a return which is even lower than the risk-free interest-rate to 
buy the short-term bonds issued by the Farm Credit system. This observation seems to be 
unconventional and further research is needed to explain this phenomenon. 
Figure 8, Figure 9 and Figure 10 visualize the spreads between the short-term, medium-
term and long-term Treasury yields and FCS yields, respectively. 
 
Figure 8 Spread between short-term treasury yields and FCS yields 
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As shown in Figure 8, the spreads between the short-term treasury yields and FCS yields 
are quite different for different maturities. In order to make the comparison more 
systematically, the observation period will be further divided into three phases. The first 
phase is from January 2009 to June 2009. The second phase is from July 2009 to January 
2010. The Third phase is from February 2010 to January 2011. 
First Phase 
The spreads for 3-Month, 6-Month and 1-Year bond had similar trends in the first phase 
(from January 2009 to June 2009). In this phase, the 3-Month and 6-Month spreads were 
very close to each other and there were days when the spreads for 3-Month and 6-Month 
were negative, while the 1-Year spread was much higher and positive. 
One other interesting observation for this phase (January 2009 to June 2009) is that the 3-
Month spread became negative for the first time during the observation period on April 
27th 2009. Although the 3-Month spread became positive 1 basis point on the next day, it 
became negative again on April 29th 2009 and remained negative for a whole month. On 
May 29th 2009, the 3-Month spread was still -11 basis points. However, it became 2 basis 
points on the next trading day and increased quickly since then.  
The 6-Month spread behaved similar to the 3-Month spread in this phase (January 2009 
to June 2009). It became negative on May 4th 2009, remained negative the whole month 
and became positive again on June 2nd 2009.   
Second Phase 
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In this phase (July 2009 to January 2010), the 3-Month spread was the biggest from July 
2009 to December 17th 2009 , followed by the 6-Month spread and the 1-Year spread, 
which reversed the trend of the first phase. From December 18th 2009 to the end of 
January 2010 the 6-Month spread was the biggest. 
The 3-Month and 6-Month spreads were parallel to each other and stayed positive the 
whole time. The 1-Year spread became negative on September 1st 2009 and remained 
negative until October 6th 2009 with only 3 exceptions.  
On December 8th 2009, the 3-Month spread was still 24 basis points, fell dramatically in 
the next 8 trading days and reached 0 basis point on December 21st 2009. It increased 
again after the Christmas 2009 and reached another peak with 16 basis points on January 
26th 2010. In the meantime, the 6-Month and 1-Year spreads underwent a similar but less 
dramatic process. On January 26th 2010, both the 6-Month and 1-Year spreads reached 
their peaks with 19 basis points and 10 basis points, respectively.  
Third Phase 
This phase was similar to the first phase. In this phase, the 1-Year spread became the 
biggest again, with the 6-Month spread and 3-Month spread close to each other. The 1-
Year spread was positive the whole time, while both the 3-Month spread and 6-Month 
spread became negative from August 20th 2010 to September 13th 2010 with a few 
exceptions.  
One other obvious exception is that the 6-Month spread became -12 basis points on June 
29th 2010 while it was 4 basis points on June 28th 2010 and 6 basis points on June 30th. 
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One possible explanation for the negative spreads is that the yield curve for the FCS 
bonds is an interpolated curve. Therefore, if the Farm Credit System believes that the 
short-term interest rate is too high and expects it to decrease in the future, it will avoid 
choosing short-term bonds. If the FCS does not issue short-term bonds during a certain 
period, there will be no actual yield available for a bond with certain maturity for this 
period. The only way to get the yield for this specific maturity is to derive it by using on-
the-run FCS bonds.  
 
Figure 9 Spread between medium-term treasury yields and FCS yields  
As shown in Figure 9, the spreads between the medium-term Treasury yields and the 
FCS yields had a falling trend over the whole observation period. The 2-Year spread and 
3-Year spread were close to each other from January 2009 to May 2009. From June 2009 
to November 2010, the 3-Year spread was much bigger than the 2-Year spread. They 
both converged again in December 2010 and stayed close to each other since then. The 5-
Year spread and 7-Year spread were much bigger than the 2-Year and 3-Year spread until 
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November 2009. They fell dramatically in December 2009 and were only slightly higher 
than the 2-Year and 3-Year spread from that time on.  
 
Figure 10 Spread between long-term treasury yields and FCS yields 
The 10-Year spread was bigger and parallel to the 20-Year spread until the middle of 
March 2010. From March 16th 2010 to March 30th 2010, the 10-Year spread underwent a 
sharp decline and fell from 81 basis points to 26 basis points. The 20-Year spread 
experienced a similar but less dramatic drop and finally exceeded the 10-Year spread on 
March 29th 2010. The 20-Year spread led after that time. From April 2010 to January 
2011, the 10-Year and 20-Year spread were parallel to each other again.   
The historical land prices are the dollars per acre values of farm real estate in the USA 
published by the USDA on an annual basis21. Data are available from 1950 to 2010.  
                                                 
21 Bloomberg ticker: RSTEVLUS Index 
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Chapter 5 
Results 
5.1 Risk-free Interest rate and bond yield 
The scatter chart of risk-free interest rate and bond yield for a given maturity is presented 
in Figure 11 which can be found at the end of this section. The regression results with 
yield of a given maturity as the dependent variable and risk-free interest rate as the 
independent variable are also included in the graph. For Example, for the 3M bonds, the 
regression equation is  
                                 ࢟ሺ૜ࡹሻ ൌ ૙. ૚૚૟૟ ൅ ૚. ૙૛ૠ૚ ∗ 	࢘ሺ૜ࡹሻ	 
This means, if the 3M risk-free interest rate increases by 1%, the 3M bond yield will 
increase by 1.0271%. However, as shown in Figure 11, the R-square is very low for 3M 
bond, while they are significantly higher for bonds with other maturities.  
Bond yields and their corresponding risk-free interest rates are positively related. T-test 
results show that the risk-free interest rate of a given maturity has significant influence on 
the bond yield of the same maturity. This is consistent with the expectation. As shown 
earlier, yield is the sum of the risk-free interest rate and the spread (risk-premium). 
Therefore, an increase in the risk-free interest rate should push up the yield.  
Moreover, even though the R-square values are higher for other maturities, they never 
exceed 0.82. This should indicate that there must be some other factors which influence 
the bond yield and are not captured by the regression.  
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According to Jacoby (2002), bond yield is also influenced by maturity, liquidity, risky 
coupon rate, coupon rate of a corresponding riskless bond, conditional probability of 
default etc. These variables might be correlated with the risk-free interest rate, but they 
are not perfectly correlated with the risk-free interest rate. Therefore, they need to be 
included in the regression. Since these variables are not included in the regression, R-
square values for bonds with different maturities are not close to 1.  
In Summary, risk-free interest rate has significant influence on the bond yield of the 
corresponding maturity.  However, the variations of risk-free interest rates are not enough 
to explain the variations of bond yield.  
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Figure 11 Relationship between risk-free interest rate and bond yield 
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5.2 Put and Spread 
The relationship between put price and spread for bonds with different maturities at the 
time of the bond issuance is shown in Figure 12 which can be found at the end of this 
section.  
There are three interesting observations in Figure 12: 
1. All Slopes are positive. This means, the correlation between implicit put option 
price and spread is positive. 
2. Figure 13 which can be found at the end of this chapter shows that the slopes for 
short-term bonds are getting steeper with decreasing maturities. For Examples, if 
the put prices for both 3-Month bond and 6-Month bond increase by $1, the 3-
Month bond is riskier relatively to the period prior to the change of the put price. 
Therefore, the 3-Month bond should have a higher yield (higher spread). 
3. The relationship between the put price and the spread is linear for bonds with 
shorter maturities. The relationship between the put price and the spread becomes 
more complex for bonds with longer maturities. It is very obvious that the 
relationship between the put price and the spread for 10-Year bond and 20-Year 
bond are not linear. 
It is easier to use the derivatives of the spread  ࢙ to the put price ࡼሺ૙ሻ to explain these 
three observations. 
Known from the previous chapter that                       	
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࢙ ൌ ࢟ െ ࢘ ൌ െ૚ࢀ ܔܖ	ሺ૚ െ
ࡼሺ૙ሻ
࡮ࢋି࢘ࢀሻ 
The derivatives of the spread  ࢙ to the put price ࡼሺ૙ሻ is        
࢙ࣔ
ࣔ࢖ሺ૙ሻ ൌ
૚
ࢀ
૚
࡮ࢋష࢘ࢀ ቀ
࡮ࢋష࢘ࢀ
࡮ࢋష࢘ࢀିࡼሺ૙ሻቁ ൌ
૚
ࢀ 
૚
࡮ࢋష࢘ࢀିࡼሺ૙ሻ , 
which is the product of  ૚ࢀ and 
૚
࡮ࢋష࢘ࢀିࡼሺ૙ሻ.  
Since both terms are always bigger than 0, the product of these two terms should be 
bigger than 0. This explains observation 1.  
The term  ૚ࢀ  decreases with increasing maturity. ࡮ࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ is the market value of the 
liabilities at time 0. The term ૚࡮ࢋష࢘ࢀିࡼሺ૙ሻ	is the inverse of the liabilities at time 0. Data 
used for the research show that the market value of the liabilities at time 0 is very close to 
the face value of the bond, if the maturity is short enough. For a short-term bond with the 
face value of $1, the term ࡮ࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ should be close to 1. The inverse of a number 
which is close to 1 should be slightly above 1. Therefore, if the maturity is small enough, 
the term ૚࡮ࢋష࢘ࢀିࡼሺ૙ሻ does not change much have no significant influence on the product of 
૚
ࢀ and 
૚
࡮ࢋష࢘ࢀିࡼሺ૙ሻ , 
૚
ࢀ should be the dominating factor. This should explain observation 2.  
However, with increasing maturities, the value of the liabilities ࡮ࢋି࢘ࢀ െ ࡼሺ૙ሻ will 
diverge more and more from its face value $1 at the time of the bond issuance. The term 
૚
۰܍షܚ܂ି۾ሺ૙ሻ will get bigger and bigger. At the same time, the term 
૚
܂ will get smaller and 
smaller with increasing maturities, but it is still big enough to have significant influence 
 46 
 
 
on the slope of the curve. When maturity gets big enough, both ૚܂ and 
૚
۰܍షܚ܂ି۾ሺ૙ሻ will have 
significant influence on the slope of the curve.  However, the influences of these two 
factors work against each other. For a given spread, risk-free interest rate will determine 
which factor dominates. Since risk-free interest rates vary over time, the relationship 
between spread and put gets more complex.  
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Figure 12 Relationship between put price and yield spread 
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Figure 13 Put price and spread adjusted to the same scale 
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5.3 Put Price 
Since the previous chapter only investigates the relationship between put price and spread 
of a given maturity, the influences of spreads and risk-free interest rates of all other 
maturities are left out of the picture. Equation (9) shows that the relationship between 
spread and interest rate of the same maturity is non-linear and it predicts that spreads and 
risk-free interest rates of all other maturities should not influence the put price of a given 
maturity. However, the explanatory power of a linear model with all available 
independent variables is an interesting question. This chapter will identify other factors 
which have influences on the put price of a given maturity and explore the explanatory 
power of a linear model for the put price. 
In order to do this, put price for a given maturity is used as the dependent variable, while 
the risk-free interest rates and spreads for all maturities are used as independent variables. 
In total, there are 9 regressions and each of them has 18 variables.  The results are 
presented in Figure 14 which can be found at the end of this section. 
Put	ሺtሻ ൌ intercept ൅ ෍ ܽ௧
ଶ଴
௧ୀ଴.ଶହ
r௧ ൅ ෍ ܾ௧ݏ௧
ଶ଴
௧ୀ଴.ଶହ
 
As explained in the previous section, short-term risk-free interest rate has very little 
influence on the put price of the corresponding maturity. This is reconfirmed by the 
regression results. For example, for a 3M put, the coefficient of the 3M treasury is -
1.9 ∗ 10ି଺ , while the coefficient of the 3M spread is 0.0025. The put price will decrease 
by $1.9 ∗ 10ି଺ if the 3M risk-free interest rate increase by 1%, but it will increase by 
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$0.0025 if the 3M spread increases by 1%. For a 20Y put, the coefficient of the 20Y 
treasury is -0.014 and the coefficient for the 20Y spread is 0.072. The put price will 
decrease by $0.014 for a 1% increase in the 20Y treasury yield and increase by $0.072 by 
a 1% increase in the 20Y spread. Despite the influence of spread still dominates,  the 
difference between them gets smaller, the influence of risk-free interest rate plays a more 
important role. 
It is also interesting to notice that the coefficients for bonds with longer maturities are 
bigger. For a 1% increase in spread, the put price for 1Y bond increases by $0.0099 while 
the put price for 3M bond increases by $0.0025.  This is also consistent with the results of 
the previous chapter(Please refer to Figure 13, slopes are steeper for bonds with shorter 
maturities22).  
The R-square values for all regressions are presented below: 
  3M 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 20Y 
 R2   1.000000 1.000000 0.999999 0.999996 0.999988 0.999943 0.999847 0.999636 0.998733 
Table 3 R-square values for a linear regression model for put price 
It is shown that R-square values are close to 1 for all maturities. Therefore, a linear 
function does a good job in explaining the put price variations of different maturities, 
even though the formula used to calculate the put price is not a linear function and only 
dependent on the spread and risk-free interest rate of a given maturity (please refer to 
equation (9)). 
                                                 
22 It is important to notice that spreads are on the vertical axis.  
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Moreover, since R-square values are bigger for bonds with shorter maturities, the prices 
for put options with shorter maturities could be better predicted using this model. 
One last important observation is that in addition to the treasury yield and the spread of a 
given maturity, the treasury yield and the spread of some other maturities also have 
significant but small influences on the put price. This should be explained by the complex 
correlations between treasury yields/spreads for different maturities. Correlation matrix 
for treasury yields and spreads of different maturities are presented in Figure 15 and 
Figure 16 which can be found at the end of this section, respectively.   
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Figure 15  Correlation matrix for treasury yields 
 
 
Figure 16  Correlation matrix for spreads 
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5.4 Implied volatility 
This chapter presents the results of the implied volatilities.  As argued in chapter 3, the 
spread and the risk-free interest rate for a given bond on a given day will be used to 
calculate the implicit put price for that bond on this specific day. The implicit put price 
will be plugged into the Black-Scholes Model and derive the implied volatilities. Figure 
17 illustrates how the implied volatility for a given maturity on a specific day is derived.  
 
 
Figure 17 Calculation of the implied volatilities 
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Since there are 522 observations for each maturity, 522 implied volatilities are derived 
for a given maturity. The summary statistics for the implied volatilities are shown in 
Table 4. 
  3M 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 20Y 
MAX 4.50% 3.90% 3.98% 4.38% 4.10% 4.77% 5.96% 6.10% 5.54% 
MIN 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.77% 1.60% 1.83% 1.65% 2.01% 2.22% 
AVERAGE 2.65% 2.32% 2.16% 2.54% 2.56% 3.05% 3.37% 4.01% 4.17% 
MEDIAN 2.96% 2.44% 2.20% 2.36% 2.41% 2.70% 3.01% 4.17% 3.92% 
Table 4 Summary statistics for the implied volatilities of different maturities 
It is important to notice that since there are negative yield spreads for short-term bonds, 
the implicit put price for a bond with a negative yield spread cannot be calculated 
(negative put prices do not make sense). A negative yield spread would mean that the 
market expects this bond to be even safer than the risk-free treasury bonds. Therefore, the 
implied volatilities for bonds with negative yield spreads are assumed to be zero.  
The average and median implied volatilities for different maturities are presented in 
Figure 18. 
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Figure 18 Average and median implied volatilities for different maturities 
The average and median implied volatilities are quite close to each other for 6M, 1Y, 2Y, 
3Y and 10Y bonds, which indicate that the implied volatilities for those maturities are 
more evenly distributed. In contrast, the implied volatilities for 3M, 5Y, 7Y and 20Y are 
less evenly distributed.  
Moreover, the average implied volatilities are smaller for short-term bonds, increase 
consistently with increasing maturities for medium-term and long-term bonds. This 
indicates that the market expects the volatility of the collateral value to be bigger for 
bonds with very short maturity, the volatility of the collateral value is the smallest for 1Y 
bond and the volatility of the collateral value increases with increasing maturity for bonds 
with a maturity of longer than 1 year.   
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5.5 Spread and Volatility 
The relationship between implied volatilities and spread for bonds with different 
maturities at the time of the bond issuance is shown in Figure 19 which can be found at 
the end of this section. This is the key part of this research, because the historical 
volatility of the land price will be plugged into the Black-Scholes Model in the next 
chapter to derive the hypothetical spread for the Farm Credit System bonds without GSE 
status. Therefore, it is of vital importance to understand the relationship between spread 
and implied volatility, which is helpful to understand the rest of this research.  
According to Merton (1974), there are two forces influencing the spread of a bond for a 
given maturity: the variances (volatility square) of the firm’s operation and the ratio of 
the present value (at the riskless rate) of the promised payment to the current value of the 
collateral, which is called as “quasi” debt to collateral value ratio in Merton’s paper.  
Mathematically, Merton defines the quasi debt to collateral value ratio (d-ratio) as 
ࢊ ൌ ࡮
ି࢘ࢀ
࡭ሺ૙ሻ 
It is called quasi debt to collateral value ratio because ࡮ି࢚࢘ does not represent the market 
value of the bond at time 0, which should be ࡮ି࢚࢟.  Therefore, the quasi debt to collateral 
value ratio which is defined in Merton’s paper overstates the real debt to collateral value 
ratio.  
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Figure 20 presents the results of the comparative statics analysis showing the influences 
of variance of the firm (volatility square) and quasi debt to collateral value ratio on the 
yield spread for a given maturity shown in Merton’s original paper (1974). 
 
Figure 20 Impact of variance of the firm and quasi debt to collateral value ratio on the 
yield spread (Source: Merton(1974)) 
This chapter is an empirical test of Merton’s theory. Based on Figure 20, for a given 
maturity and a given	ࢊ, the relationship between spread and variance (implied volatility 
square) should be convex first, but will become concave if variance (implied volatility 
square) is big enough.   
Unfortunately, since both the implied volatility and ࢊ are not constant for a given 
maturity, Figure 19 showing the relationship between spread and implied volatility 
captures the influences of volatility and ࢊ simultaneously.  
It can be shown that the quasi debt to collateral value ratio increases with increasing 
maturities. This is because the net collateral ratio is held constant at 1.03. Therefore, the 
collateral value required as shown earlier is  
“Quasi” debt collateral value ratio 
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࡭ሺ૙ሻ ൌ ૚. ૙૜࡮ࢋି࢟ࢀ 
By a given net collateral ratio, ࢊ could be rearranged to formula 
ࢊ ൌ ࡮ࢋ
ି࢘ࢀ
૚. ૙૜࡮ࢋି࢟ࢀ ൌ
૚
૚. ૙૜ࢋ
࢙ࢀ 
It shows that ࢊ	of a specific bond is dependent on the net collateral ratio which is 1.03, 
the spread and the maturity. When the maturity is small, the spread is very small, too. The 
product of these two terms is close to 0, which does not exert significant influence on ࢊ. 
Therefore, ࢊ is close to the inverse of the net collateral ratio. The variations of quasi debt 
to collateral value ratios for different maturities over the observation period are presented 
in Figure 21 which can be found at the end this section. As shown in Figure 21, quasi 
debts to collateral value ratios are almost constant for short-term bonds. 
In addition to Figure 21, which visualizes the variations of quasi debt to collateral value 
ratio for different maturities, Table 5 shows the minima and maxima of quasi debt to 
collateral value ratios for all maturities.  The difference between the maximum and 
minimum for a given maturity presents the exact variations of the quasi debt to collateral 
value ratio: 
d-ratio 3M 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 20Y 
MAX 0.971963 0.973211 0.977974 0.991476 0.998399 1.03192 1.093999 1.14613 1.240583 
MIN 0.970875 0.970876 0.970875 0.972539 0.973259 0.978462 0.979948 0.992549 1.024107 
Difference 0.001088 0.002335 0.0071 0.018936 0.02514 0.053459 0.114051 0.153581 0.216476 
Table 5 Maxima and Minima of the d-ratios for all maturities 
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The differences between the maxima and minima of the quasi debt to collateral value 
ratios are 0.001, 0.002 and 0.007 for 3M bond, 6M bond and 1Y bond, respectively. The 
variations are very small.  In contrast to that, the differences between the maxima and 
minima are getting bigger and bigger with increasing maturities for medium-term and 
long-term bonds. The differences are so significant that they cannot be ignored.  
Since d-ratios are almost constant for short-term bond as shown in Figure 21 and Table 
5, the dominating factor influencing spreads for short-term bonds is volatility. Therefore, 
the graphs showing the relationship between volatility and spread of 3M, 6M and 1Y 
bonds should be consistent with the graph on the LHS of Figure 20. By comparing the 
corresponding graphs, it is shown that this is true23.  
This does not hold for medium-term and long-term bonds: if ࢀ	is getting bigger, spread ࢙ 
is getting bigger, too. The product of these two terms increases, ࢊ increases accordingly. 
Therefore, the graphs showing the relationship between spread and implied volatility for 
2Y, 3Y, 5Y, 7Y, 10Y and 20Y capture the influence of volatility and the influence of ࢊ 
simultaneously.  
Moreover, Merton shows in his paper that the relationship between spread and maturity is 
dependent on the value of the quasi debt to collateral value ratio. 
                                                 
23 Please refer to Figure 22 which can be found at the end of this section. 
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Figure 23 Impact of maturity on the yield spread (Source: Merton(1974)) 
As shown in Figure 23, spread decreases with increasing maturity, given the quasi debt 
to collateral value ratio is bigger or equal to 1. However, it increases and then decreases 
with increasing maturity once the quasi debt to collateral value ratio is smaller than 1. 
Based on the quasi debt to collateral value ratio as shown in Figure 21 which can be 
found at the end of this section, the FCS bonds could be subdivided into three groups:  
bonds with maturities which are no bigger than 3 years belong to the first group. They all 
have quasi debt to collateral value ratios smaller than 1 over the whole observation period; 
5Y bond and 7Y bond with quasi debt to collateral value ratios which are sometimes 
bigger than 1 and sometimes smaller than 1 belong to the second group; the third group 
has 10Y and 20Y bond as members which have higher-than-1 quasi debt to collateral 
value ratios the whole time.    
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According to Merton’s theory, for a given volatility and a given quasi debt to collateral 
value ratio, the curve describing the relationship between spreads and maturities which 
are no bigger than 3 years (d<1) should be bell-shaped. To test this theory, volatilities are 
held constant at 3% for different maturities. Unfortunately, since both volatility and quasi 
debt to collateral value ratio are changing over time, it is impossible to hold these two 
variables constant for all maturities.  However, as shown in the fourth column of Table 6, 
the quasi debt to collateral value ratios are almost constant for bonds with maturities 
which are no bigger than 3 years. Therefore, it will be treated as if it were constant. As 
shown in Figure 24, it displays a bell-shaped curve.  
Maturity Date IV d Spread 
3M 7/13/2009 3.0% 0.971025 0.0621 
6M 10/6/2009 3.0% 0.971677 0.1653 
1Y 1/22/2009 3.0% 0.973868 0.3079 
2Y 5/26/2009 3.0% 0.978964 0.4149 
3Y 5/5/2009 3.0% 0.984861 0.4768 
Table 6 Relationship between spread and maturity for a given volatility and a close-to-
constant d-ratio 
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Figure 24 Relationship between maturity and spread for a given volatility and a close-to-
constant d-ratio 
It is hard to interpret the relationship between spread and maturity for 5Y and 7Y bonds 
because the quasi debt to collateral value ratio for these bonds can be either smaller or 
bigger than 1.  
For 10Y and 20Y bonds, spread should decrease with increasing maturity, because they 
have quasi debt to collateral value ratios over 1. However, since the quasi debt to 
collateral value ratio is higher for 20Y bond and spread increases with increasing d-ratio 
as shown in Figure 20, these two forces work against each other.  
Maturity Date  IV d Spread 
10Y 05/21/10 3.0% 1.018633 0.4802 
20Y 11/08/10 3.0% 1.06171 0.4472 
Table 7 Relationship between spread and maturity for a given volatility but various d-
ratios 
‐0.02
0.08
0.18
0.28
0.38
0.48
3M 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y
Spread for a given volaitility with 
d<1
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This specific example shows that the effect of maturity dominates. 
In Summary, there are three forces influencing spread: maturity, quasi debt to collateral 
value ratio and volatility. Spread increases with increasing quasi debt to collateral value 
and volatility. The influence of maturity depends on the quasi debt to collateral value and 
is not unambiguous.  
 3M 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 20Y 
       d 0.9711 0.9713 0.9723 0.9767 0.9808 0.9974 1.0167 1.0587 1.1392 
IV 2.65% 2.32% 2.16% 2.54% 2.56% 3.05% 3.37% 4.01% 4.17% 
S  0.1205 0.0943 0.1483 0.2965 0.3374 0.5369 0.6544 0.8577 0.7937 
Table 8 Average debt to collateral value ratios, average implied volatilities and average 
spreads for all maturities. It is important to notice that bonds with maturities which are 
no longer than 3Y have a lower –than-1 d-ratio. The d-ratio for 5Y and 7Y bonds can be 
either smaller or bigger than 1. 10Y and 20Y bonds have d-ratios above 1.  
3M, 6M and 1Y bonds have almost the same average quasi debt to collateral value ratios, 
which are smaller than 1. In this case, two forces influence spread: maturity and volatility.   
The 3M bond has a higher average volatility but a lower maturity in comparison to the 
6M bond. These two forces have opposite influences on the spread:  The shorter maturity 
leads to a lower spread while a higher average volatility leads to a higher average spread.  
The data show that the average 3M spread is higher than the average 6M spread. This 
indicates that the impact of volatility dominates.    
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The 6M bond has a higher average volatility but a shorter maturity in comparison to the 
1Y bond.  This is exactly the same case as the 3M bond and 6M bond pair. However,  the 
impact of maturity on spread dominates this time.  
For bonds with 2Y and 3Y maturities, all three factors influence the spread. Since both 
the average volatility and the average quasi debt to collateral value ratio for the 3Y bond 
are bigger than that for the 2Y bond, the 3Y bond has a higher average spread. 
As shown earlier, the spreads for 5Y and 7Y are hard to interpret because the influence of 
maturity is not unambiguous. Even though the average quasi debt to collateral value is 
less than 1 for 5Y bond and bigger than 1 for 7Y bond, it is shown in Figure 21 that they 
could be either smaller or bigger than 1 over the observation period.  
For 10Y and 20Y bonds, the quasi debt to collateral value ratios are bigger than 1 the 
whole time. This means, spread should decrease with increasing maturity. On the other 
hand, both the average debt to collateral value ratio and the average volatility are higher 
for 20Y bond, which lead to a higher spread. Therefore, the result depends on the relative 
magnitude of these two offsetting effects. Based on the data, the influence of maturity 
dominates; the average spread for the 10Y bond is higher than the average spread for the 
20Y bond.  
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Figure 19  Relationship between  volatilities and spread 
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Figure 21  Quasi debt to collateral value ratios over the observation period 
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Figure 22  Comparison with Merton’s result 
 69 
 
 
5.6 Hypothetical Farm Credit System bond yield without GSE status 
It is shown in Table 4 that the biggest implied volatilities of all maturities never exceed 
6.07%, which represents the historical volatility of the farm land price. The 95% 
confidence interval of the historical land price volatility is shown in Table 9.  
Actual historical land price volatility  6.07% 
Standard Error  0.000493 
upper 95% limit  6.16% 
lower 95% limit  5.97% 
Table 9 95% confidence interval of the historical land price volatility 
As it shows, the maxima of the implied volatilities of all maturities are under the lower 
95% limit. Therefore, it can be claimed with high confidence that GSE status reduces the 
market perception for Farm Credit System’s business risk and the Farm Credit System 
benefits from GSE status. 
This section will answer the question which has been asked at the beginning of this thesis: 
How would the spread look like without GSE status? 
Plugging the historical land price volatility (6.07%) into the Black-Scholes Model, the 
put price on the bonds with all maturities which have no implicit government guarantee 
can be derived. Since the underlying risks are higher (the historical land price volatility is 
higher than the implied volatility), the put prices increase accordingly. Increasing put 
prices lead to higher yields. The results are presented in Table 10: 
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  3M  6M  1Y  2Y  3Y  5Y  7Y  10Y  20Y 
No GSE  1.4618  2.0050  2.3919  2.8540  3.2389 3.9280  4.4898  4.9055  5.5036 
GSE  0.2382  0.3190  0.5271  1.1181  1.5986 2.6068  3.3852  4.1196  4.8873 
Difference  1.2236  1.6860  1.8648 1.7359 1.6403 1.3212 1.1045  0.7860  0.6163
Table 10 Hypothetical yields without GSE status under constant volatility (6.07%) 
The first row presents the average hypothetical bond yields without GSE status over the 
whole observation period; the second row presents the average actual bonds yields of the 
Farm Credit System bonds with GSE status for comparison; the third row presents the 
difference between the hypothetical average spread and the actual average spread for a 
given maturity.  
As shown in Table 10, the differences of spreads are particularly big for short-term 
bonds and much smaller for long-term bonds: the difference for the 1Y bond is as high as 
186 bps, in contrast to that,  the difference for the 20Y bond is only 62 bps. This result is 
surprising. While the hypothetical spreads for 10Y and 20Y seem to be reasonable, an 
average yield of 1.46% for 3M bond, an average yield of 2% for 6M bond and an average 
yield of 2.4% for 1Y bond seem to be too high for the period from January 2009 to 
February 2011.  
The main reason for this is because a constant volatility (which is equal to the historical 
volatility of the farm land price) for all maturities is assumed. As shown in chapter 5.4, 
average implied volatilities are not the same for all maturities and lower for bonds with 
shorter maturities and higher for bonds with longer maturities.  
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Since the historical land price volatility (6.07%) is based on the observations of over 60 
years, it is reasonable to assume that it better represents the collateral value volatility of 
bonds with the longest maturity (20Y bond). For collateral value volatilities for the bonds 
with all other maturities, it is assumed that they change proportionally: 
ࡵ࢓࢖࢒࢏ࢋࢊ	࢜࢕࢒ࢇ࢚࢏࢒࢏࢚࢟	ሺ૛૙ࢅሻ
ࢎ࢏࢙࢚࢕࢘࢏ࢉࢇ࢒	࢜࢕࢒ࢇ࢚࢏࢒࢏࢚࢟	ሺ૛૙ࢅሻ=
ࡵ࢓࢖࢒࢏ࢋࢊ	࢜࢕࢒ࢇ࢚࢏࢒࢏࢚࢟	ሺࢀሻ
ࢎ࢏࢙࢚࢕࢘࢏ࢉࢇ࢒	࢜࢕࢒ࢇ࢚࢏࢒࢏࢚࢟	ሺࢀሻ. 
The volatilities for all other bonds are calculated with the following formula: 
        Historical volatility (T) = Implied volatility (T)ࢎ࢏࢙࢚࢕࢘࢏ࢉࢇ࢒	࢜࢕࢒ࢇ࢚࢏࢒࢏࢚࢟	ሺ૛૙ࢅሻࡵ࢓࢖࢒࢏ࢋࢊ	࢜࢕࢒ࢇ࢚࢏࢒࢏࢚࢟	ሺ૛૙ࢅሻ . 
Plugging the adjusted historical volatilities into the Black-Scholes Model, the yields for 
different maturities can be derived. The results are presented in Table 11.  
  GSE volatility  No GSE volatility GSE yield No GSE yield Difference (bps)
3M  2.65%  3.86%  0.2382  0.3744  13.62 
6M  2.32%  3.37%  0.3190  0.5193  20.02 
1Y  2.16%  3.15%  0.5271  0.7609  23.38 
2Y  2.54%  3.70%  1.1181  1.5416  42.35 
3Y  2.56%  3.73%  1.5986  2.0269  42.83 
5Y  3.05%  4.45%  2.6068  3.1434  53.66 
7Y  3.37%  4.91%  3.3852  3.9641  57.89 
10Y  4.01%  5.84%  4.1196  4.8077  68.81 
20Y  4.17%  6.07%  4.8873  5.5036  61.63 
Table 11 Hypothetical yields without GSE status with adjusted volatilities 
The first column of Table 11 lists all maturities. The actual average implied volatilities 
for all maturities are presented in the second column. The adjusted volatilities used to 
derive the hypothetical yields are shown in the third column. They are calculated based 
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on the formula shown above. The fourth column presents the actual average yields of the 
Farm Credit System bonds with different maturities over the observation period. The 
hypothetical yields of the Farm Credit System bonds without GSE status can be found in 
the fifth column. They are calculated using the adjusted volatilities shown in the third 
column. The sixth column presents the differences of the yields without and with GSE 
status.  
The results show that the average bond yield for a 3M FCS bond from January 13th 2009 
to February 10th 2011 would be 0.3744% if the Farm Credit System had no GSE status, 
which is 13.62 bps higher than the actual bond yield.  The difference between the 
hypothetical yield and the actual yield increases with increasing maturity and reaches its 
peak with 10Y bond. The difference between the hypothetical yield and the actual yield is 
68.81 bps. The difference decreases slightly for 20Y bond.  
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5.7 Sensitivity analysis 
Merton (1974) shows that spread is influenced by volatility and quasi debt to collateral 
value ratio for a given maturity. In chapter 5.6, the historical land price volatility is used 
to represent the market perception for the collateral value volatility and the net collateral 
ratio is held constant at 103%. The next two subsections will present the influences of 
various volatilities and various quasi debt to collateral value ratio (d-ratio) on the bond 
yields.  
5.7.1 Various volatilities 
As shown in chapter 3, the compositions of the assets are quite complex for the Farm 
Credit System and they are not all backed by the farm land. Therefore, 6.07% might not 
be a good estimation for the collateral value volatility.  Thus, a sensitivity analysis with 
different volatilities is done to show the influences of different volatilities on the bond 
yields. 
  GSE yield  5.86%  5.93% 6.00% 6.07% 6.14% 
3M  0.2382  1.3215  1.3679  1.4152  1.4618  1.5122 
6M  0.3190  1.8522  1.9030 1.9545 2.0050 2.0593 
1Y  0.5271  2.2444  2.2936 2.3433 2.3919 2.4440 
2Y  1.1181  2.7216  2.7659 2.8105 2.8540 2.9006 
3Y  1.5986  3.1172  3.1579 3.1989 3.2389 3.2816 
5Y  2.6068  3.8205  3.8565 3.8927 3.9280 3.9658 
7Y  3.3852  4.3914  4.4243 4.4575 4.4898 4.5243 
10Y  4.1196  4.8164  4.8463 4.8763 4.9055 4.9368 
20Y  4.8873  5.4308  5.4552 5.4798 5.5036 5.5291 
Table 12 Impact of various volatilities on yields 
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The actual yields of bonds with GSE status can be found in the second column. The third 
to seventh columns present the hypothetical yields of bonds without GSE status. The 
yields in the third column are calculated under the assumption that the market perception 
for collateral value volatility is 5.86% for the FCS bonds with all maturities.  The same 
interpretation applies to column four to column seven.  
As shown in the above table, yields increase with collateral value volatility. It is 
consistent with Merton’s theory: if the market expects the volatility of the underlying 
asset to be higher, it will require a higher compensation.  
Therefore, if the Farm Credit System wants to maintain a low cost to raise capital after 
losing its GSE status, efficient risk management could help them to save cost. When it 
could make the market believe that its collateral value volatility is really low, they could 
issue bonds at a much lower yield. 
5.7.2 Various d-ratios 
It is shown in the previous section that d-ratio is primarily influenced by the net collateral 
ratio. The previous research is based on the assumption that the market expects the net 
collateral ratio to be equal to the minimum required net collateral ratio. If the Farm Credit 
System could increase its minimum net collateral ratio, its d-ratio will get smaller; bond 
yield will decrease if anything else remains the same. The results of the sensitivity 
analysis with different collateral ratios for a given collateral value volatility 6.07% are 
shown in Table 13.  
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  GSE yield  1.03  1.035  1.04  1.045  1.05  1.055  1.06  1.065 
3M  0.2382  1.4618  1.0652  0.7846 0.5860  0.4460 0.3481 0.2802  0.2338
6M  0.3190  2.0050  1.6113  1.3078 1.0716 0.8867 0.7415 0.6274  0.5379
1Y  0.5271  2.3919  2.0522  1.7774 1.5522 1.3657 1.2103 1.0801  0.9706
2Y  1.1181  2.8540  2.5841  2.3593 2.1693 2.0070 1.8670 1.7455  1.6394
3Y  1.5986  3.2389  3.0087  2.8147 2.6488 2.5052 2.3798 2.2695  2.1718
5Y  2.6068  3.9280  3.7431  3.5855 3.4492 3.3298 3.2243 3.1303  3.0461
7Y  3.3852  4.4898  4.3310  4.1950 4.0766 3.9724 3.8797 3.7966  3.7216
10Y  4.1196  4.9055  4.7713  4.6557 4.5545 4.4650 4.3850 4.3129  4.2475
20Y  4.8873  5.5036  5.4079  5.3248 5.1864 5.1864 5.1276 5.0743  5.0255
Table 13 Impact of various d-ratios on yields 
The second column shows the actual average yields of the Farm Credit System bonds 
with different maturities over the observation period. Column three to column ten present 
the hypothetical average bond yields of the Farm Credit System bonds without GSE 
status and with a constant collateral value volatility of 6.07% for all bonds. Column three 
shows the average bond yields if the minimum net collateral value is 103%. The same 
interpretation applies to column four to column ten.  
Bond yields decrease for all bonds with increasing net collateral ratio. This is because 
once the net collateral ratio increases, more assets are required for the same bond. It is 
less likely that the asset value falls under the barrier that the Farm Credit System decides 
to default on the bonds.  
Moreover, despite yields decrease with increasing net collateral ratio the whole time for a 
given maturity, its marginal change is bigger at the beginning. Since volatilities are held 
constant at 6.07%, according to Merton’s (1974) theory, the only factor which influences 
the spread for a given maturity is the d-ratio. The d-ratios are lower for bonds with higher 
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net collateral ratios.  The average d-ratios for 3M bonds with different net collateral ratios 
are presented in Table 14.  
collateral 
ratio 
1.03  1.035  1.04 1.045 1.05 1.055 1.06  1.065
3M d‐ratio  0.9730  0.9674  0.9620 0.9569 0.9521 0.9473 0.9427  0.9382
3M yield  1.4618  1.0652  0.7846 0.5860 0.4460 0.3481 0.2802  0.2338
Table 14 Average d-ratios for 3M bonds with different net collateral ratios 
By comparing the 3M yields with different d-ratios with Merton’s curve, these two 
curves have the same shape. It is shown in Figure 25. 3M yields with different d-ratios 
are presented on the LHS of Figure 25. Merton’s original graph can be found on the LHS 
of Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25 Impact of d-ratios on yield and comparison with Merton’s finding (Source: 
Merton (1974)) 
It is to notice that Merton uses the y-axis to represent spreads. In contrast to that, the y-
axis of the graph on the LHS represents yields. It does not matter because 3M risk-free 
interest rates are the same for all bonds, even though the d-ratios vary. Therefore, the 3M 
spread curve is a parallel shift of the 3M yield curve. 
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By comparing the hypothetical yields with the actual yields under GSE status, it shows 
that the Farm Credit System could efficiently reduce its cost of capital as long as they 
could increase its minimum net collateral ratio. The Farm Credit System could have 
issued 3M bonds at an average yield which is even lower than the actual 3M average 
yield with GSE status if it had not GSE status but a net collateral ratio of 106%.  
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6. Conclusion and extension suggestions 
This thesis tries to quantify the impact of GSE status on the yields of the Farm Credit 
System bonds. It presents a framework to answer the question how the bond yield would 
look like for the Farm Credit System without GSE status. 
In order to do so, the daily Farm Credit System bond yields for different maturities from 
January 13th 2009 to February 10th 2011 are used to identify the factors which influence 
spread. Merton (1974) shows that the spread of a bond is influenced by the volatility, the 
maturity and the quasi debt to collateral value ratio (d-ratio). The factors influencing 
spreads of the FCS bonds are consistent with Merton’s theory.  
Moreover, this thesis presents the hypothetical Farm Credit System bond yields without 
GSE status. It shows that the bond yields would have been higher over the observation 
period. It would have been especially high for long-term bonds and the difference could 
have been as big as 69 basis points.  
This thesis also shows that the Farm Credit System could reduce its capital cost by 
efficient risk management and a higher net collateral ratio.  
Due to data limitations, there are still many important issues which are not covered by 
this paper. The following paragraphs present some extension suggestions.  
As for now, the Farm Credit System bonds enjoy the same tax status as the treasury 
bonds. They are exempt from the local and state taxes. Federal taxes, however, are still 
due on the earned interest. If the Farm Credit System lost its GSE status, it might also 
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lose its favorable tax treatments and the cost of capital will increase. This research does 
not consider the influence of tax treatment on the yield of the Farm Credit System bonds. 
A wide range of research has been done to investigate the tax effect on bond yield: 
Cowan and Pertrine (2002), Elton and Green (1998) and Green and Odegaard (1997) etc.  
One other interesting extension of this paper would be the explanation for the negative 
spreads of the short-term bonds. As shown in chapter 4, there were times when spreads 
for short-term bonds were negative. This would mean that the market would expect the 
risk of the short-term Farm Credit System bonds to be even lower than the risk-free 
treasury notes, which is not possible. Moreover, as shown in chapter 4, bonds with 3M, 
6M and 1Y maturities had negative spreads in different periods.  Since negative spreads 
for different maturities occurred at different times, a single policy change may not be 
enough to explain it. The explanation offered in this thesis is insufficient to explain this 
phenomenon; further research is needed to explore this problem.  
Furthermore, due to data limitations, this paper does not consider the influences of 
special bond features on spread. According to Jacoby (2002) and Duffee (1998), 
callability has significant influences on the spread of a given bond. Specifically, the 
conditional probability of a call, the call price set in the call provision, the call-protected 
period etc. will all have impacts on the spread of a given bond. Since the Federal Farm 
Credit Bank Curve does not distinguish between callable and non-callable bonds, it is 
impossible to quantify the impacts of call features on spread based on this data set.  
Last but not least, it is assumed in this research that GSE status does not depend on 
maturity. In other words, it is assumed that one would expect that the impact of GSE 
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status to remain the same regardless of maturity. However, it is not always the case in 
reality. Especially now when the Farm Credit System is in danger of losing its GSE status, 
some people may expect the Farm Credit System to lose its GSE status in the future. This 
expectation will certainly impact the expected payments for long-term bonds, but to less 
extent the expected payments for short-term bonds. This impact is not captured by this 
research. Further research could be done to explore the impact of maturity on GSE status 
by making the impact of GSE status as a function of maturity.   
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